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Corporate Power and Social Policy: 
The Political Economy of the Transnational Tobacco Companies 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Drawing on published tobacco document research and related sources, this article 
applies Farnsworth and Holden’s conceptual framework for the analysis of corporate 
power and corporate involvement in social policy (2006) to the transnational tobacco 
companies (TTCs). An assessment is made of TTCs’ structural power, the impact 
upon their structural position of tobacco control (TC) policies, and their use of agency 
power. The analysis suggests that, as a result of the growth of TC policies from the 
1950s onwards, TTCs have had to rely on political agency to pursue their interests 
and attempt to reassert their structural position. The collapse of the Eastern bloc and 
the liberalisation of East Asian economies presented new structural opportunities for 
TTCs in the 1980s and 1990s, but the development of globally coordinated TC 
policies facilitated by the World Health Organisation’s Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control has the potential to constrain these.  
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Introduction 
 
The release of millions of internal tobacco industry documents to public view since 
the 1990s, as a result of litigation in the USA, has presented an unprecedented 
opportunity to develop understanding of a major industry which has a direct impact 
on public health (Hurt and Robertson, 1998; Malone and Balbach, 2000). Much 
analysis of the industry and its strategies and tactics has since been published, 
contributing greatly to our understanding of transnational tobacco companies (TTCs). 
To date, much of this analysis has been descriptive (Carter, 2005) and has not often 
drawn on theoretical approaches outside of public health (Bero, 2003: 283).  
This article attempts to theorise the activities of TTCs by adapting Farnsworth 
and Holden’s (2006) conceptual framework for the analysis of corporate power and 
involvement in social policy, and systematically applying that framework to an 
analysis of TTCs and their relationships with states and international institutions. 
In doing so, it draws on tobacco document research published to date, as well as 
theoretical and historical literature on tobacco companies, work by the World Bank, 
and empirical work by tobacco control advocates. The article thus contributes a 
theoretical analysis of TTC power, based upon a synthesis of published work; as such 
it is limited by its reliance on the available published empirical work, and future 
empirical work may contribute to a refinement of the analysis developed here.  
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A Conceptual Framework for Analysis 
 
Farnsworth and Holden (2006) begin by making a distinction between structural and 
agency power (see Farnsworth, 2004, for an extended discussion of these two types of 
power). Corporate structural power operates where governments are constrained to act 
in ways that safeguard or promote the fundamental needs of business without 
particular businesses or their collective organisations having to exert agency (i.e. to 
take explicit action). As Farnsworth and Holden (2006: 475) put it, ‘The most 
important mechanism of structural power stems from capital’s ability to make free 
investment decisions’, since ‘business investment is a key determinant of future 
production, employment and consumption levels…’ The opportunity for businesses to 
exit a national economy by, for example, moving a manufacturing plant to another 
(perhaps lower cost) country increases corporate structural power. Processes of 
economic globalisation have thus tended to increase corporate structural power, 
though this varies by sector. The extent to which structural power impacts on 
governments ‘depends on how mobile capital is; the number of alternative investment 
opportunities open to firms; the relative strength of the economy and the degree to 
which governments will be prepared to compete to retain present investment or attract 
new investments’ (Farnsworth and Holden, 2006: 475). However, the more active and 
effective international institutions are at making policy and coordinating regulation, 
the more corporate structural power is potentially reduced, since corporations cannot 
exit the global economy (Farnsworth, 2004).  
Where structural power is insufficient to protect a corporation’s interests, they 
may turn to agency power. Farnsworth and Holden (2006) distinguish between three 
broad types of direct business inputs into social policy: political engagement, 
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institutional participation, and provision or production. Corporations may exert 
influence through political engagement in a number of ways. Business leaders and 
politicians may be members of the same networks, as argued by elite theorists (Scott, 
1991) and some Marxists (Miliband, 1969). Corporations may engage in various 
forms of lobbying, fund politicians or their parties directly, or fund think tanks and 
research institutes that help to shape debate (Farnsworth and Holden, 2006: 476).  
Companies may also exert influence over policy makers by participating in 
institutions that manage or have an effect on welfare outcomes. For example, since 
the Thatcher governments in the UK after 1979, it has become common for business 
people to occupy key positions on the boards of quangos, hospitals and schools, and 
business has become integrated into welfare services through the development of 
public-private partnerships.  
Finally, firms may play an important role in the delivery of services or the 
production of goods that are important for welfare. Farnsworth and Holden’s (2006) 
typology of provision and production (derived from Holden, 2005) is wide ranging, 
but incorporates only those firms that play a functional role in the creation or 
provision of welfare goods or services. This typology requires amendment to take 
account of companies such as TTCs which have an overtly negative impact on health 
and wellbeing, as discussed below.  
The remainder of this article applies an adapted version of this analytical 
framework to TTCs, drawing on existing tobacco document research and related 
sources. The concentrated and transnational nature of TTCs is first examined. 
Structural aspects of power relating to TTCs are discussed next, providing an analysis 
of the supply-side factors that may constrain governments’ actions towards TTCs. The 
discussion is then broadened to include an analysis of the demand-side factors that 
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may impact upon the structural position of TTCs, and which may affect their ability to 
profitably sell their products. As discussed below, the structural power of TTCs has 
been insufficient to prevent a number of governments from acting to constrain TTCs’ 
freedom of action in a number of ways in the pursuit of public health goals. TTCs’ 
use of political agency, partly in response to such government action, will thus be 
examined, followed by discussions of institutional participation and production as it 
relates to welfare outcomes. It is important to note that, whilst we make a conceptual 
distinction between structural and agency power, both are interdependent and variable 
over time (Farnsworth, 2004). A ‘structurationist’ approach is therefore taken here, 
whereby the use of agency by both TTCs and governments plays a crucial role in 
modifying the overall structural position of TTCs, in terms of both their ability to 
further influence governments and in terms of their freedom to produce and sell their 
products.  
 
  
Concentration and Transnationality of TTCs 
 
British and American tobacco companies first began to internationalise towards the 
end of the nineteenth century, with British American Tobacco (BAT) formed in 1902 
as a joint company to run all business outside of the two home countries. BAT later 
became a solely British company as a result of anti-trust action in the US (Cox, 2000). 
Today, the four major TTCs (ranked in order of magnitude of sales) are the Altria 
Group, which owns Philip Morris, BAT, Japan Tobacco and Altadis (Imperial). Table 
1 provides a summary of the size and degree of transnationality and 
internationalization of these four corporations in 2006, extracted from Fortune 
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magazine’s G500 list (Fortune, 2007) and the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development’s (UNCTAD) transnationality index (UNCTAD, 2008). All four 
companies were large enough to feature in Fortune magazine’s G500 list of the 
world’s largest 500 corporations (by revenue), with Altria the largest of the TTCs and 
the 71st largest company in the world. Both Altria and BAT were transnational enough 
to feature in UNCTAD’s ‘transnationality index’ of the 100 most transnational non-
financial corporations in the world, with BAT the most transnational TTC and the 43rd 
most transnational company in the world (see Table 1). A period of consolidation saw 
Japan Tobacco acquire Gallaher and Imperial acquire Altadis in 2007 
(Imperial/Altadis now trade as Altadis). In 2007, the four TTCs had a combined share 
of the global tobacco market (by volume) of 52.2% (excluding China, dominated by 
the huge state monopoly, CNTC), with Altria/Philip Morris at 18.7%, BAT at 17.1%, 
Japan Tobacco at 10.8% and Altadis/Imperial at 5.6% (Hedley, 2007). In early 2008, 
Altria created Philip Morris International (PMI) as a separate company from Philip 
Morris USA with its headquarters in Switzerland, perhaps to protect its international 
operations from litigation in the USA. PMI is the world’s third most profitable 
consumer goods concern (O’Connell, 2008).  
The industry operates in an essentially oligopolistic fashion, and the market 
positions of TTCs are strongly protected by barriers to entry. Shepherd (1985) has 
analysed the three sets of barriers to entry identified by Bain (1956) as they affect the 
cigarette industry. Two of these, absolute cost advantages of existing firms and 
economies of scale, do not constitute major constraints on new firms entering the 
industry. Shepherd argues that supply conditions such as economies of scale that are 
related to production process technology (as opposed to product technology) do not 
constitute major constraints to new firms entering the cigarette industry, and neither 
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do the supply of raw materials (such as tobacco leaf) or other factors of production. 
Smaller scale operations are as efficient as larger ones, since the average cigarette 
plant uses a large number of identical cigarette-making and packing machines. 
Similarly, supply conditions for the principal inputs do not pose high barriers to entry, 
since non-leaf inputs such as paper and filters are cheap and, although tobacco leaf is 
expensive, ‘the basic tendency towards oligopsonistic pressure on growers maintains 
fairly low prices’ (Shepherd, 1985: 72).  
However, Bain’s third set of barriers to entry, consumer preferences for the 
products of existing producers, is very important in the tobacco industry. These relate 
to the demand creation efforts of firms, and include investments in distribution 
networks, sales forces and market research, and physical differences in the form of the 
product and its packaging. The latter are relatively unimportant in their own right, 
since they are relatively easy to copy, but attain significance through ‘the creation of 
subjective brand images through massive advertising and other types of promotion’ 
(Shepherd, 1985: 73). Customer loyalty to existing brands thus constitutes a powerful 
barrier to entry, since potential entrants to the market must incur advertising 
expenditure and product form segmentation above that of established firms. The 
demand creation efforts of the leading firms thus permit above competitive profits, 
and are ‘the most important single source of high concentration in the industry’ 
(Shepherd, 1985: 74). On the rare occasions when new entrants or small firms have 
tried to compete on the basis of price in mature markets such as the US, predatory 
action by the oligopoly has been used to undercut the new entrant and eliminate 
competition so that oligopolistic profits can be restored (Adams and Brock, 1998).  
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The Structural Power of TTCs 
 
Globalisation tends to increase the structural power of corporations in their 
relationships with states, primarily by increasing the opportunities for exit from any 
given national economy. This is particularly true for manufacturing firms that are 
relatively mobile. Like other corporations, TTCs must take account of both supply 
and demand factors. On the supply side, this means that they must be able to grow or 
source tobacco leaf in a cost-effective way, and manufacture cigarettes and other 
tobacco products from it. TTCs will have structural power where economies rely on 
the employment provided by their investment in leaf growing or cigarette 
manufacture, and the income taxes and export earnings that flow from this. Their 
room for manoeuvre will be substantially increased where there are many countries 
from which they can source, or potentially source, tobacco leaf, and alternative 
countries in which they can situate manufacturing sites.  
We may expect that the more structural power TTCs have, as a result of the 
dependence of any given country on the employment provided by leaf growing or 
cigarette production, the more likely that country’s government is to oppose effective 
tobacco control (TC) policies at the national and global levels. Worldwide, an 
estimated 10 million full-time equivalent workers are employed in tobacco farming, 
with almost 2 million employed in the manufacture of tobacco products (Warner & 
Mackay, 2006: 72). Data compiled by the World Bank (1999; Jacobs et al, 2000) 
provide a good overall picture of the significance of tobacco production to various 
countries. The manufacturing side of the tobacco industry is a relatively small source 
of jobs, as it is highly mechanized; the Bank estimates that in most countries tobacco 
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manufacturing jobs account for well below 1% of total manufacturing employment. 
There are, however, a few important exceptions to this pattern, with tobacco 
manufacturing accounting for 8% of total manufacturing output in Indonesia, and 
between 2.5% and 5% in Turkey, Bangladesh, Egypt, the Philippines and Thailand 
(World Bank, 1999).  
Tobacco farming is generally much more significant in terms of employment. 
More than 100 countries currently grow tobacco, of which about 80 are developing 
countries. China, the USA, India and Brazil account for two-thirds of total production, 
with China responsible for 45.6% of all tobacco grown in 1997 (Jacobs et al, 2000). 
The industry estimates that 33 million people are engaged in tobacco farming 
worldwide, although this includes seasonal and part-time workers, family members, 
and farmers who grow other crops as well (World Bank, 1999), and the industry may 
have an incentive to inflate such estimates. Many of these farmers may be locked into 
dependent and exploitative relationships with TTCs, yielding dubious benefits for 
farmer welfare (Patel et al., 2007). Over the two decades to 1999, the share of global 
production by high-income countries fell from 30% to 15%, while that by Middle 
Eastern and Asian countries rose from 40% to 60% (World Bank, 1999; Jacobs et al, 
2000). The World Bank argues that reduced demand for tobacco would have little 
long-term effect on most tobacco producing countries as any decline would be gradual 
and production is a small part of most economies. Spending on tobacco would be 
reallocated to other goods and services, so for most countries there would be little 
impact on their overall economic welfare. It is possible that some major producers 
that export a large proportion of their crop may be negatively affected. Zimbabwe, 
Malawi, Brazil, Turkey, Greece and Italy all export more than seven-tenths of their 
crop. However, only two countries are substantially dependent on raw tobacco for 
 10 
their export earnings: Zimbabwe at 23% of export earnings and Malawi at 61%. 
Additionally, Bulgaria, Moldova, the Dominican Republic, Macedonia, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tanzania rely significantly on tobacco as a source of foreign exchange, although 
their shares of the global market are small (World Bank, 1999; Jacobs et al, 2000).    
While only a few countries are significantly dependent on tobacco growing 
and exporting, therefore, it is recognised that any shift in production may be 
disruptive and painful for many of the farmers involved. The Bank acknowledges that 
tobacco has been a relatively attractive crop for many farmers because it has 
historically provided a higher net income yield per unit of land than most cash crops; 
its global price is relatively stable compared with other cash crops; the industry often 
provides in-kind support and loans; and other crops may cause farmers problems with 
storage, collection and delivery (World Bank, 1999; Jacobs et al, 2000). Overall, the 
fate of tobacco farmers may potentially constitute a political obstacle that TC 
advocates need to address.  
TTCs have attempted to exploit the perceived economic reliance of some 
developing countries on tobacco production, and the importance of other health 
issues, to argue that TC is a high-income country issue. TC has even been presented 
by the industry as a new form of imperialism (WHO, 2000). However, given the 
limited dependence of most countries on tobacco production, these arguments are 
primarily an attempt by TTCs to defend their interests through agency (i.e. political 
persuasion), rather than a reflection of real structural power.  Furthermore, tobacco-
related deaths exert a heavy economic (as well as human) toll, which needs to be set 
against the potential disruption of diversification away from tobacco production.  It 
would be unfortunate if developing countries failed to take adequate TC action 
because of an incorrect perception that TTCs have more structural power than they in 
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fact do. In practice, there has been no straightforward relationship between the degree 
of a country’s tobacco production and its decision to adopt the World Health 
Organisation’s (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC); China, 
India and Turkey, three of the world’s largest tobacco producers, have ratified the 
FCTC, whilst the USA and Indonesia, also major producers, have not (Warner & 
Mackay, 2006: 80; WHO, 2009). Malawi and Zimbabwe, the two most tobacco 
dependent countries, have not signed it. 
While few countries are genuinely dependent on tobacco growing, the large 
number of countries that grow tobacco, and the ability of the crop to easily grow in 
diverse soil types, ensure TTCs a diversity of supply. This means that only if the 
largest growers, such as China, the USA, India or Brazil, took strong supply-side 
measures against tobacco would there be any significant impact, and there would 
likely be an increase in ‘replacement’ production should this happen (especially since 
prices would rise, attracting new entrants to the market) (Jacobs et al., 2000: 334). 
The World Bank argues that the potential for alternative suppliers, alongside high 
demand, means that leaf-focused supply-side measures are likely to be ineffective in 
reducing tobacco supply or consumption (World Bank, 1999; Jacobs et al, 2000). 
However, Hu et al (2006) point out that, as Chinese industrial sectors such as textiles, 
electronics and automobiles have grown, the tobacco industry’s relative contribution 
to employment and tax revenues has declined, making it easier for the Chinese 
government to enact TC measures should it choose to do so.  
Although the World Bank dismisses supply-side TC measures focused on 
tobacco farming, further attention could be given to manufacturers themselves. 
Callard et al. (2005) explore the components of an effective supply-side approach to 
TC involving the nationalisation of tobacco product manufacture or its transfer to a 
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non-profit entity with incentives to reduce consumption.  A move of this kind could 
be an effective means of reducing the supply of tobacco products, but the political 
viability of this strategy would depend on the degree of structural and agency power 
TTCs are able to draw upon.  Short of outright expropriation, such a policy would 
entail considerable short-term costs to governments.  Furthermore, the collapse of the 
Soviet Bloc in the late 1980s and early 1990s, together with the liberalisation of East 
Asian economies, has presented new structural opportunities for TTCs. Privatisation 
and trade liberalisation, in the past facilitated by international organisations such as 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
(and the US government, as discussed below), have allowed TTCs to strengthen their 
positions in ways that will be difficult to reverse.  Such developments have reinforced 
the focus of tobacco control on demand-side measures such as marketing restrictions 
and taxation.  
 
 
Demand-Side Factors and Tobacco Control 
 
The previous section focused on the supply-side aspects of TTC activities, since it is 
mainly from the employment, income taxes and export earnings provided by their 
investment in a country that transnational companies derive their structural leverage 
over governments. However, demand-side factors are also of particular importance 
when analysing the overall structural position of TTCs. As already indicated, demand 
creation is particularly important for tobacco companies. Yet the nature of their 
product has led to government actions designed to affect the way the product is sold, 
priced or marketed, which may curtail TTCs’ freedom of action or affect their ability 
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to make profit. Like any company, to be viable TTCs must be able to benefit from 
sufficient demand for their products, and be able to adequately market these and find 
suitable retail outlets. The more national markets TTCs have access to, the more 
protected they are from the potential impact upon their profits of the actions of any 
given government (although they will of course attempt to maximise sales in all 
markets). Furthermore, taxes on the sale of tobacco products may also be an important 
source of income for governments, and heavy reliance on such income has historically 
been used to increase TTCs’ bargaining power. This may be particularly important in 
some developing countries, where the capacity to collect income taxes efficiently may 
be lacking.    
Demand for tobacco products is different from that of other products for two 
reasons.  First, nicotine is highly addictive and much of the demand for tobacco 
products is sustained by this. Document research has shown that much product 
development and marketing (e.g. to young people) by tobacco companies has been 
aimed at creating and sustaining this addiction. Regulatory measures must thus 
recognise that addiction distorts consumption choices when compared to other 
products.  Second, governments have developed TC policies in response to the 
damage to public health from tobacco use, most of which are aimed at curtailing 
demand.   
There are a variety of means by which governments have attempted to restrict 
demand for tobacco products, including education and awareness campaigns, the 
introduction of warning labels, product disclosure regulations, advertising and 
sponsorship bans, taxation to raise the price of tobacco products, smoking restrictions 
in public and work places, and tobacco cessation support programmes. The impact on 
TTCs should not be underestimated. According to Shepherd (1985: 81), ‘large-scale 
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demand creation efforts constituted the basic competitive advantage of US cigarette 
firms’ in their global expansion from the 1960s. Government restrictions on direct 
investment and marketing where TTCs do not yet have a strong base may therefore be 
an effective means for their containment. This is because, according to Shepherd 
(1985: 81), ‘effective demand creation require[s] the existence of local facilities, close 
ties with local distributors, local market research, etc.’ Whilst tobacco products can be 
exported profitably, demand creation advantages can best be exploited through local 
presence. Thus whilst export strategies have been important to TTCs (including 
through the facilitation of smuggling where seen as necessary), their preference is 
often for a direct local presence (see, for example, Lee et al, 2008).  
Forcing a rise in the price of tobacco products through taxation has proven to 
be a particularly effective means of reducing consumption (Ding, 2005). As indicated 
above, government reliance on the income derived from tobacco taxation may 
potentially increase the bargaining power of TTCs, which have resisted an increase in 
such taxation and used the inability of some governments to effectively control 
smuggling as a form of leverage. However, the World Bank has shown that as long as 
governments take effective action against smuggling they need not be concerned 
about losing revenue as a result of increasing tobacco sales taxes, since increases in 
such taxes tend to reduce consumption and increase the tax take (World Bank, 1999; 
Sunley et al, 2000; Chaloupka et al, 2000).  
The challenge for governments seeking to strengthen TC is that, as TTCs 
expand their presence into more countries, they become more insulated from the 
effects of TC policies in any single country. The expansion abroad of American 
tobacco corporations from the 1960s was a direct result of the growing awareness of 
the health effects of smoking in the USA (Shepherd, 1985), and the more recent 
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success of TC policies in reducing tobacco consumption in developed countries 
makes the need to continue to expand into developing countries particularly important 
for the TTCs. The globalised nature of TTCs means that, despite the relative lack of 
real dependence upon tobacco growing or manufacturing by most tobacco producing 
countries, TTCs currently have a strong structural position to operate from, since they 
can source tobacco leaf from many countries and have multiple markets in which to 
distribute and sell their products. The role of developing and former Communist 
countries has been, and will continue to be, crucial here in expanding markets 
globally.  
Nevertheless, demand-focused TC policies and increasing awareness of the 
health consequences of smoking have led to a gradual decline in tobacco consumption 
in high-income countries (Lopez et al, 1994), and a growing movement for the 
adoption of such policies in emerging markets, so that markets have been increasingly 
constrained by TC policies at the national level. In response, this article argues that 
TTCs have sought to exert various forms of agency power to protect and extend their 
interests. As discussed below, this is a major explanation for the scope and intensity 
of industry activity from the 1950s to impede, undermine and circumvent TC policies. 
More recently, where international institutions have attempted globally coordinated 
regulation, led by the WHO’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), 
TTCs’ structural position has been further eroded.  TTCs have thus used agency 
power at the global, as well as national, level to protect and advance their interests.  
The various forms of agency power used by TTCs are discussed in the next section.  
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Agency Power and Political Engagement 
 
Attempts by TTCs to influence TC policy have taken two broad forms: direct and 
indirect. Such efforts have been revealed by analysis of internal industry documents. 
This article does not attempt to provide a comprehensive review of such attempts, but 
rather to identify the types of agency power engaged in, and the reasons for their use.  
In this section, we draw upon published analyses of internal industry documents of 
TTCs’ attempts to influence public policy and the scientific process, in order to 
illustrate the forms of political agency deployed by TTCs. In doing so, we are 
constrained by the limited number and scope of studies published to date. 
Nonetheless, we highlight specific examples of TTC use of political agency.  Caution 
is required before generalising from such cases, and broader understanding of the 
patterns of industry political behaviour will emerge as fuller analyses become 
available.  
First, the specific form that direct efforts have taken has depended on local 
conditions, including the extent and type of existing and prospective TC policies and 
initiatives and which particular level of government has responsibility for these. 
Tactics at the US state level have included the use of contract lobbyists; campaign 
contributions to legislators; contributions to legislators’ political caucuses and parties; 
the provision of various gifts, honoraria, corporate hospitality and charitable 
donations; alliances with other interest groups; and the use of front groups such as 
bogus restaurant and hotel associations to influence state legislation (Givel and 
Glantz, 2001). Similar tactics have been used at the federal level. Here, we draw on 
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data concerning expenditure on lobbying and donations to politicians and political 
parties from the US, since data for such expenditure in other countries remains scarce.  
Between 1999 and 2007, the US tobacco industry spent more than $170 
million on professional lobbying firms and in-house lobbyists in attempts to influence 
Congress (TFK, 2007). Of this, $105.7 million was spent by Altria/Philip Morris, with 
the next largest amount spent by Lorillard at $14.7 million. Industry lobbying 
expenditure in 2006 alone was over $18 million, with $12.8 million of that being 
spent by Altria/Philip Morris. Additional to this direct lobbying, the tobacco 
companies would often mobilise smokers or owners and employees of tobacco-related 
businesses to contact their elected representatives (ibid). Internal documents indicate 
that Philip Morris had a database of nearly three million smokers as early as 1986, 
which it used to generate letters and phone calls to elected officials. American tobacco 
corporations often worked together through the Tobacco Institute, a lobbying and 
public relations organisation formed in 1958. Payments to lobbyists by the Tobacco 
Institute in the 1990s were highest in US states where there was a high level of 
tobacco control activity such as increased cigarette excise taxes (Morley et al, 2002; 
Bero, 2003). As the Tobacco Institute’s strategic plan put it in 1989:  
 
Clearly, tobacco's lobbying capability on Capitol Hill and elsewhere continues 
to constitute a vital strength... The far-reaching lobbying efforts by The 
Institute and the member companies, supported by relevant coalitions, media 
relations and other strategies, have provided the industry with support from 
elected officials from tobacco and non-tobacco states. (Tobacco Institute, 
1989) 
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Political donations to federal candidates, national parties and non-party 
political action committees (PACs) in the US totalled more than $34.7 million 
between 1997 and 2007 (TFK, 2007). This total includes $12 million to federal 
candidates, $16.8 million in ‘soft money’ donations to the Republican and Democratic 
parties between 1997 and 2002 (after which such donations were prohibited), and $5.6 
million to non-candidate committees. Of this, Republican candidates and committees 
received 78% ($27 million) and Democratic candidates and committees 19% ($6.7 
million). Altria/Philip Morris donated $13.8 million of the total, more than twice as 
much as the next largest contributor, RJ Reynolds (ibid). At the state level, tobacco 
manufacturers and retailers gave $96 million to candidates, committees and ballot 
measures campaigns in the 2005 and 2006 election cycles, of which 73 % went to 
Republicans (NIMSP, 2007). R.J. Reynolds contributed $48.8 million of this, whilst 
Philip Morris/Altria contributed $39 million (ibid).  
Tobacco industry contributions to legislators’ re-election campaigns are 
statistically related to more pro-tobacco behaviour by recipients (Givel and Glantz, 
2001). When legislation to provide the US Food and Drug Administration with 
authority to regulate tobacco products was voted on in Congress in 2007, the 46 
senators that did not sponsor the bill took on average more than seven times as much 
tobacco money since 2001 as the 54 that did sponsor it, and similar patterns could be 
seen in the House of Representatives (TFK, 2007). When the US Senate Health, 
Education, Labour and Pensions Committee voted on the legislation, those members 
of the committee voting against the provision received an average of more than 
fourteen times the amount of tobacco industry campaign contributions as those who 
voted for it (TFK, 2007). (1) 
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Direct links with politicians at the executive level of government also exist. In 
the UK, for example, Kenneth Clarke, the Conservative politician and former 
Chancellor of the Exchequer was a non-executive director of BAT until 2008. 
Margaret Thatcher, the former British Prime Minister, in 1992 accepted a role as a 
paid consultant to Philip Morris, reportedly advising the company on strategies to 
penetrate emerging markets (Sunday Times, 1992). BAT has similarly cultivated high-
level political connections in some developing countries, including, for example, 
‘close relationships with successive Kenyan presidents’ (Patel et al, 2007). Utilising 
its contacts in Kenya, BAT was able to persuade the government to pass legislation 
drafted by the company itself to compel farmers to sell tobacco exclusively to it (Patel 
et al, 2007).  
Second, indirect attempts to influence policy have generally comprised efforts 
to undermine the scientific evidence on tobacco and health.  This tactic has been 
central to industry responses to evidence since the 1950s, for example, of the adverse 
health effects of smoking, addictive nature of nicotine and the dangers of second-hand 
smoke.  Documents show that these indirect attempts have often been coordinated 
through front organisations and paid consultants. The Council for Tobacco Research 
(CTR), for example, formed in 1954, was designed to fund ‘independent’ scientific 
research on the link between smoking and lung cancer, but industry documents reveal 
its true purpose to cast doubt on that link (Bero, 2003). McDaniel et al (2008) have 
analysed the activities of TTC ‘issues management organisations’ using industry 
documents. The International Committee on Smoking Issues (ICOSI), formed in 1977 
by seven tobacco corporation chief executives, built a global network of regional and 
national manufacturing associations in order to coordinate anti-TC strategies, later 
changing its name to INFOTAB. In 1992, INFOTAB was replaced by two smaller 
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organisations, the Tobacco Documentation Centre and Agro-Tobacco Services, the 
latter of which supports the industry-backed International Tobacco Growers 
Association in promoting their arguments about the economic importance of tobacco 
to developing nations (McDaniel et al., 2008).  
In addition to acting at the national level, and where necessary coordinating 
their actions globally, TTCs have sometimes acted through, or benefited from, 
international governmental institutions. For example, US-based TTCs recruited the 
power of the US Trade Representative (USTR) to further their goals through the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Whilst Japan, Korea and Taiwan 
bowed to US demands to remove their bans on tobacco imports, Thailand resisted and 
was forced to do so as the result of a GATT disputes panel. The panel ruled that 
Thailand’s ban on imports was discriminatory and thus in contravention of GATT 
rules, although it accepted that tobacco harmed health. Tobacco control measures 
such as advertising bans were considered legitimate as long as they were applied 
equally to domestic and foreign companies, and Thailand has since successfully 
introduced a range of measures, including increased size and prominence of health 
warnings, the expansion of smoke-free areas, and increases in tobacco taxation 
(Vateesatokit, 2000).  However, the Thai GATT case is of such importance because 
the inability to close the market to imports removes an important source of bargaining 
power for governments (Shepherd, 1985). The use of GATT (now WTO) rules to 
force open markets has been an important example of TTC agency, but one that has 
facilitated new structural advantages as target countries are forced to liberalise. 
Furthermore, the evidence clearly shows that where TTCs are allowed into previously 
protected tobacco markets, the prevalence of smoking rises as a result of the 
advertising and other competitive activities of the TTCs (Taylor et al, 2000).  
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IMF policies of encouraging privatisation and inward investment into the 
tobacco industry in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (FSU) have had a 
similarly negative impact (Gilmore and McKee, 2004; Gilmore, McKee and Collin, 
2007). TTCs acted strategically to take advantage of the political and economic 
transition there, often taking over privatised state monopolies. Gilmore and McKee 
(2004) show that TC measures have been particularly unsuccessful in those FSU 
states with high levels of industry investment during transition, demonstrating the 
mutually reinforcing nature of structural and agency power. In Uzbekistan, for 
example, BAT’s investment in the state tobacco company was the country’s largest 
privatisation, accounting for more than 30% of its foreign direct investment between 
1992 and 2000 (Gilmore, McKee and Collin, 2007). BAT engaged in a number of 
anti-competitive practices, securing President Karimov’s support to conclude a deal 
giving them a monopoly position, and contravening the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development’s guidelines for multinational enterprises (Gilmore, 
McKee and Collin, 2007). As part of its negotiating conditions, BAT overturned TC 
legislation (Gilmore et al, 2006) and redesigned the tobacco taxation system in its 
favour (Gilmore, Collin and Townsend, 2007). 
As already described, leading TTCs have acted in concert on a global scale 
where their common interests have been threatened. It would be a mistake to assume 
that TTCs always have the same interests, but there has been a powerful incentive for 
them to act in concert, including at the global level. As Collin (2003: 76) observes, the 
TTCs cannot afford to act against each other’s core interests or only on a country 
level, since ‘the passage of effective tobacco control measures in any one country 
potentially “rais[es] the bar” in other parts of the world.’ They are therefore 
determined to head off a potential ‘domino effect’ which might result from a 
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tightening of tobacco control in successive countries (Collin, 2003: 82). The FCTC 
thus represents an unprecedented threat. The negotiation of the FCTC was the first 
time that the WHO had used its treaty-making powers (Yach and Bettcher, 2000), and 
was signed by 168 of the World Health Assembly’s 192 member countries in May 
2003. The treaty acquired the status of international law in February 2005 after the 
fortieth country ratified it (Warner & Mackay, 2006), and as of February 2009, 163 
countries had ratified or otherwise become parties to it (WHO, 2009). The treaty 
commits the minimum international principles and guidelines for TC that all states 
parties must adopt (WHO, 2003).  
In response, TTCs have not only coordinated their actions globally to 
influence national governments, but to influence, utilise or undermine international 
institutions. As discussed above, where governments coordinate their activities 
globally, companies’ structural position may be weakened. Depending on its size, the 
loss of any national market in itself may not threaten the overall profitability of any 
given TTC, but in a global climate of progressive tobacco control, a significant 
reduction in smoking across countries could have profound implications for all TTCs. 
Opening new markets and heading off effective TC measures in regions such as 
Eastern Europe and Asia has thus been crucial to their strategies.  
An international committee of experts appointed by the WHO found that, in 
trying to subvert the WHO’s TC efforts, the industry has sought to:  
 
divert attention from the public health issues, to reduce budgets for the scientific 
and policy activities carried out by WHO, to pit other UN agencies against WHO, 
to convince developing countries that WHO’s tobacco control program was a 
“First World” agenda carried out at the expense of the developing world, to 
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distort the results of important scientific studies on tobacco, and to discredit WHO 
as an institution. (WHO, 2000: iii)  
 
These activities ‘slowed and undermined effective tobacco control programs around 
the world’ (WHO, 2000: iii). A range of tactics were utilised in the pursuit of these 
goals (WHO, 2000), including both direct and indirect means. Relationships were 
built with WHO staff, including paying them as consultants whilst they worked at the 
WHO. Other agencies, including the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), the 
World Bank, UNCTAD, the United Nations Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) and the International Labour Organisation (ILO), were used to acquire 
information on the WHO. TTCs lobbied the FAO to oppose WHO policies and to 
promote the economic importance of tobacco over health considerations. Apparently 
independent individuals and institutions were commissioned to challenge WHO’s 
competence and agenda through published articles and presentations to the media and 
politicians, and outside organisations, including trade unions, were used to lobby 
against the WHO. Manipulating the public and scientific debate about the health 
effects of tobacco was a key part of the strategy (WHO, 2000). McDaniel et al. (2008) 
even describe how ICOSI/INFOTAB serviced National Manufacturer’s Associations 
on a regional basis, ‘[i]n an apparent effort to emulate the structure of the WHO’.  
The liberalisation of Asian markets and the collapse of the former Soviet Bloc 
in the 1980s and 1990s thus allowed TTCs to strengthen and renew their structural 
position. Political action was used in both cases to realise these structural 
opportunities, i.e., agency power has been used to regain and strengthen structural 
power. However, TTCs have lost legitimacy as a result of revelations from internal 
industry documents, and the signing of the FCTC has the potential to significantly 
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constrain their freedom of action. The extent to which it does this in practice will 
depend to a considerable degree on whether states parties press forward to bring 
national tobacco control policies in line with the FCTC. To date, countries already 
committed to tobacco control, including Thailand, Brazil, Canada and Australia, have 
even adopted additional measures beyond the minimal standards set out in the FCTC, 
whilst in other countries, such as Ecuador and Japan, the optional language of the 
Convention has allowed the adoption of ineffective legislation (Lee, forthcoming). 
Civil society organisations have provided an important source of countervailing 
agency power in influencing national and global policy (Collin et al, 2005), despite 
not having comparable resources to TTCs, and their role in drawing attention to 
ineffective implementation of the FCTC will remain crucial. The negotiation of 
related protocols on illicit trade and crossborder advertising also provides a potential 
means for giving the Convention greater weight, given that states will need to sign up 
to these as binding agreements.  
Many ‘emerging markets’ are only beginning to consider effective TC 
measures and, as what the industry calls ‘light markets’, have provided scope for 
TTCs to consolidate their structural position, as well as being targeted with political 
actions previously applied with effect in mature markets. However, as a growing 
number of countries have strengthened TC measures, described by the industry as 
becoming ‘dark markets’, TTCs have been compelled to continue to use agency 
power to protect and advance their interests. At the same time, the delegitimisation of 
the industry has necessitated more subtle forms of action by TTCs aimed at changing 
perceptions and winning back credibility. As discussed below, this explains the recent 
emphasis on ‘corporate social responsibility’ initiatives (Collin and Gilmore, 2002). 
Table 2 summarises the development of TC policies from the 1950s, the types of 
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political action engaged in by TTCs, and the structural contexts to, and outcomes 
from, these political activities.  
 
 
Institutional Participation 
 
As described above, TTCs have utilised a number of front organisations (as well as 
directly employed or contracted lobbyists, lawyers and public relations specialists) in 
order to advance their interests, and have attempted to influence the actions of a range 
of international institutions. However, their participation in state or international 
institutions in a management or ‘partnership’ capacity has been extremely limited, 
primarily as a result of the controversial nature of their core business and, more 
recently, revelations about their efforts to actively undermine public health initiatives. 
Today, few genuine public health agencies will collaborate with the tobacco industry.  
One notable form of institutional participation by TTCs, however, has been 
their involvement in standards setting (Bero, 2003). Through the Cooperation Centre 
for Scientific Research Relative to Tobacco they played an important role in 
developing standards set by the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) 
(Bialous and Yach, 2001). ISO standards are used to measure the tar and nicotine 
yields of cigarettes through machine-smoked cigarette tests. However, such tests 
cannot be used to determine the health effects of smoking because, unlike machines, 
human smokers compensate for ‘low tar’, ‘low nicotine’ cigarettes with ventilated 
filters by taking more puffs, breathing more deeply or covering the holes with their 
fingers (Hurt and Robertson, 1998; Bero, 2003). Nonetheless, tobacco companies use 
these tests as the basis for marketing ‘low tar’ cigarettes, with the suggestion that such 
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cigarettes are less damaging to health. By dominating all the committees that were 
involved in setting ISO tobacco standards, the industry was able to supply industry-
derived data, inhibit participation by other actors, and develop testing methods 
favourable to the industry that were then accepted by the organisation (Bialous and 
Yach, 2001; Bero, 2003). 
 
 
Welfare and the Production of Illness  
 
The analytical framework developed by Farnsworth and Holden (2006) includes 
provision of welfare services, and the production of goods necessary for welfare, as a 
category of business involvement in social policy. Tobacco companies provide no 
welfare enhancing goods or services; their products are instead responsible for the 
deaths of millions of people. It has been estimated that tobacco will kill half of all 
current smokers - 650 million people (Warner & Mackay, 2006). The death toll from 
tobacco in the twentieth century is estimated at 100 million, and on current trends will 
total one billion during the twenty-first century, with the burden of tobacco-related 
mortality and morbidity moving increasingly to the developing world (ibid). The 
prevalence of tobacco use tends to increase with the entry of TTCs into national 
markets, as a result of their aggressive marketing tactics and the related increase in 
competition for sales (Taylor et al, 2000).  
Farnsworth and Holden’s analytical framework (2006) thus needs to be 
amended to incorporate this production of ‘public bads’ (i.e. illness and death). 
Widening the analytical framework in this way has broader importance since 
corporations in other sectors where health has been harmed, such as the asbestos and 
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lead industries, have used similar tactics to TTCs (Bero, 2000).  Furthermore, 
corporations in many sectors are capable of either enhancing or damaging health, 
depending on their behaviour, including the food and pharmaceutical sectors. Social 
policy analysts (Farnsworth, 2008a) and criminologists (Fooks, 2009) have utilised 
the concept of ‘corporate harm’ to refer to activities that impact negatively on welfare 
but which may not be illegal, whilst public health scholars have used the concept of 
‘industrial epidemics’ to characterize the effects of the activities of the tobacco and 
other industries (Majnoni d’Intignano, 1998). Others have analysed the negative 
consequences for health and quality of life of the broader system of neoliberal 
globalisation (Navarro, 2007). As Jahiel and Babor (2007: 1335) argue, there are a 
number of commercial sectors where ‘public health oriented policies run the risk of 
being opposed by industrial corporations in a health versus profit trade-off.’ These 
include tobacco, alcohol, food, cars and guns (Majnoni d’Intignano, 1998; see also 
Freudenberg and Galea, 2008), as well as activities related to diseases of consumers, 
workers and community residents caused by industrial promotion of consumable 
products, job conditions and environmental pollution. Such industrial disease 
epidemics ‘are driven at least in part by corporations and their allies who promote a 
product that is also a disease agent’ (Jahiel and Babor, 2007: 1335). Table 3 
incorporates this concept of corporate harm into the analytical framework developed 
by Farnsworth and Holden (2006).  
TTCs have increasingly turned to ‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR) 
programmes in an attempt to re-legitimise their activities. For example, BAT’s first 
‘social responsibility’ report was published in 2002, and involved dialogue and 
reporting activities using an independent verifier to assess these against the AA1000 
Standard of the Institute of Social and Ethical Accountability (Collin and Gilmore, 
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2002). BAT’s website publicises reporting against a range of statements and  
standards, relating to such issues as marketing, environmental management, 
employment and child labour (BAT, 2009). Other activities have included assistance 
to tobacco growers, charitable donations, scholarships, involvement in ‘anti-
smuggling’ measures, and ‘youth smoking prevention’ programs (Barraclough and 
Morrow, 2008). Yet such initiatives have been marked by the adoption of ineffective 
or harmful practices on issues such as under-age smoking and evasiveness on key 
questions such as smuggling. Most significantly, BAT’s own documents have 
revealed the primary function of such initiatives as ‘reputation management’ 
(Rimmer, 2005).  
In the case of TTCs, as with many other corporations, CSR is therefore best 
regarded as a form of political agency rather than a form of welfare provision. 
However, in modifying Farnsworth and Holden’s typology, we must acknowledge the 
dual nature of CSR initiatives as in some instances performing some degree of a 
welfare function (Farnsworth, 2008b) alongside their primary purpose as a form of 
political agency. This is reflected in Table 3, where CSR is listed simultaneously as a 
form of political agency as well as a form of welfare provision/production. This is not 
to draw attention from the essentially contradictory, limited and potentially harmful 
effects of many CSR initiatives, however, since the increased welfare produced by the 
governmental policies that they are often designed to impede, delay or substitute for 
would likely be greater than any welfare outcome from the CSR initiatives 
themselves.  
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Conclusions 
 
This article has attempted to theorise the activities of TTCs by systematically 
applying an adapted version of Farnsworth and Holden’s (2006) conceptual 
framework for the analysis of corporate power to TTCs and their relationships with 
states and international institutions. This has involved an explication of TTC 
structural and agency power, utilising published tobacco document research and other 
sources. The analysis indicates that the structural and agency power of TTCs have 
existed in a dynamic relationship with each other. While the accumulation of 
scientific evidence about the health effects of tobacco, and the introduction of TC 
policies, began to erode TTCs’ structural position from the 1950s, they have used 
agency to regain and strengthen their position.  
Globalisation is a key strategy in this process. Since they first began to 
globalise, TTC strategies have often followed a pattern of initially gaining access to 
new markets through exports, but investing within the target country as soon as 
possible.  They have made use of trade bargaining via the US Trade Representative 
and the GATT rules where necessary to gain access, in many cases also gaining 
market share through smuggling, especially where legal imports to a target country 
have been restricted or taxes are high. Ultimately, direct investment to establish a 
local presence has often been preferred as the end goal because this has allowed TTCs 
to best engage in the demand creation efforts so important to their modus operandi 
(Shepherd, 1985). Direct ownership, most often through acquisition of domestic 
producers, has been preferred, but local licensing agreements and joint ventures have 
been used where necessary. Thus, GATT rules, the inability of individual 
governments to effectively tackle smuggling, privatisation in Eastern Europe and the 
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FSU, and economic liberalisation in developing (particularly Asian) countries have all 
strengthened TTCs’ structural position.   
Although few countries are genuinely dependent on tobacco growing or 
manufacture for employment or export earnings, TTCs retain a strong structural 
position due to their diversity of supply and multiplicity of national markets. 
Nationalisation along the lines proposed by Callard et al. (2005) should be considered 
as an effective supply-side approach to tobacco control.  The political difficulties and 
economic costs of such a strategy may mean that, in the short term, where 
manufacture and sale is already in private hands, governments should focus on 
ensuring the effective use of taxation powers, alongside other demand-side measures 
contained in the FCTC.  However, state monopolies continue to account for 40% of 
world cigarette sales (Warner and Mackay, 2006) and, where such monopolies still 
exist, resisting privatisation may form an important part of a broader TC strategy.  
More effective global action against smuggling, beginning with the negotiation of a 
dedicated protocol under the FCTC, is also necessary. 
 Business structural power changes over time (Farnsworth, 2004), and it is 
clear that TTC power has been affected by changes in the world economy, such as the 
collapse of the Soviet Bloc and liberalisation in East Asia. From 2007 onwards the 
world economy was subject to a profound economic shock in the form of the global 
financial crisis and subsequent recession. It is conceivable that this economic crisis 
may in turn have an impact on the structural power of TTCs, but at the time of writing 
it was too soon to fully evaluate the extent to which this might be the case. TTC’s 
structural position relies in part on their access to multiple markets, so it may be that 
as economies across the world experience recession, reduced purchasing power will 
lead to falling consumption of tobacco products, or at least to ‘downtrading’ to 
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cheaper brands. TTCs may therefore have to amend their marketing and political 
strategies as they are forced to rely less on their global brands and compete instead 
with lower-cost, perhaps locally produced, brands. However, the addictive nature of 
tobacco means that consumption tends to fall more slowly in such situations than for 
many other consumer goods, and this fact may also mean that tobacco stocks appear 
as a relatively safe ‘home’ for investors, thus providing TTCs with continued funds 
for their expansion. PMI, for example, continued to benefit from strong growth in 
developing countries in the third quarter of 2008, driven by historically high levels of 
disposable consumer income in those countries, and JPMorgan included the company 
on a list of 16 stocks it thinks will outperform US markets during a global recession 
(Brinson, 2009). Like other transnational companies, TTC’s structural power may 
also be enhanced as they benefit from a cheapening of labour power and a wider pool 
of potential labour as unemployment increases. Whether the experience of crisis and 
recession will lead to a wider paradigm shift away from the neo-liberal consensus to 
an environment in which governments and citizens favour greater regulation of 
businesses at the national and/or global levels, and how this might affect TTCs, is not 
yet clear.  
Demand-side TC policies have proven to be an effective form of regulation in 
a growing number of countries, and efforts to globally extend implementation have 
led TTCs to utilise agency power to pursue their interests. Although the collapse of 
the Soviet bloc and the liberalisation of Asian economies presented new structural 
opportunities for TTCs in the 1990s, the potential for globally coordinated TC 
policies facilitated by the FCTC has threatened to constrain these.  TTCs therefore 
face using agency at the global, as well as national level, to pursue their interests, and 
have resorted to CSR initiatives in an attempt to recover lost legitimacy. From a 
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public health perspective, the relative success of TTC tactics and strategies, along 
with their demonstrable negative impact on health, provides a powerful rationale for 
their containment and regulation. To be effective this must be developed further at the 
global level as well as at the national level. The FCTC represents a turning point in 
global tobacco control, but it is imperative that it is comprehensively implemented by 
national governments, and that strong protocols in areas such as illicit trade are 
agreed. It is logical to conclude that the TTCs will continue to manoeuvre to block 
effective implementation wherever they can, and such activity will need to be 
monitored closely. Greater coordination and policy coherence among international 
organisations is also a necessity, so that the WTO and the IMF can become genuine 
partners in a coherent policy towards tobacco control. The ad-hoc inter-agency task 
force on tobacco control created in 1999, under the leadership of the WHO and 
involving the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO alongside other UN agencies (Yach 
and Bettcher, 2000), was the start of this process but needs to be developed further.  
As well as providing an analytical framework within which to make sense of 
the activities of TTCs, Farnsworth and Holden’s framework (2006) has here been 
adapted to take account of those corporations whose activities have a direct negative 
impact on health and welfare.  However, the degree of access to internal tobacco 
industry documents is so far unparalleled.  It is therefore difficult to compare TTCs to 
other large corporations in seeking to draw broader conclusions about the relative 
importance of structural and agency power.  Nonetheless, this article suggests that 
TTC reliance on agency has been extensive, partly as a result of the controversial 
nature of tobacco products and the increasing development and success of TC 
policies.  As policy debates increase about the need for stronger regulation of other 
large corporations, including those with substantial public health impacts (such as the 
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food and drinks industries), insights provided by analyses of tobacco industry 
documents may help us to understand the changing nature of their power within a 
global economy. 
 
 
Notes 
1. It is important to note, however, that regulation may affect different tobacco 
companies differently. Altria/Philip Morris gave formal support to the FDA 
initiative, whilst most other tobacco companies opposed it. The smaller 
companies attributed Altria’s support for the initiative to the ‘competitive 
advantage’ that the largest companies sometimes obtain from regulation, and 
feared that the measure would have ‘the effect of locking in market share’ 
(Burritt and Gaouette, 2009).  
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Table 1: Size, Transnationality and Internationalization of TTCs (2006) 
(Millions of dollars and number of employees) 
Company Altria Group British 
American 
Tobacco  
Japan Tobacco Altadis 
G500 ranking 71 404 415 482 
UNCTAD ranking 
By foreign assets 
51 86   
UNCTAD 
Ranking by TNI 
61 43   
UNCTAD ranking by II 25 43   
Home country USA UK Japan France/ 
Spain 
Total assets 104,270 34,896   
Foreign assets 34,090 19,871(b)   
Total sales 101,407 17,961 17,536 15,687 
Foreign sales 58,327 11,125(b)   
Total employment 175,000 97,431 33,428 28,103 
Foreign employment 140,958(a) 78,478(b)   
TNI % 57 66   
Total affiliates 121 284   
Foreign affiliates 104 220   
II  86 77   
Profits 12,022 3,488 1,802 568 
 
Sources:  
G500 ranking and profits from Fortune (2007) 
Total sales for Japan Tobacco and Altadis = revenue as reported in Fortune (2007) 
Total employment for Japan Tobacco and Altadis from Fortune (2007) 
All other data from UNCTAD (2008) 
 
Notes: 
Figures for 2006. 
Fortune magazine’s G500 list ranks the world’s 500 largest corporations by revenue.  
UNCTAD’s World Investment Report ranks the world’s top 100 non-financial TNCs by foreign assets, 
‘transnationality’ and ‘internationalization’.  
TNI, the Transnationlity Index, is calculated by UNCTAD as the average of the following three ratios: 
foreign assets to total assets, foreign sales to total sales and foreign employment to total employment. 
II, the Internationalization Index, is calculated by UNCTAD as the number of foreign affiliates divided 
by the number of all affiliates (Note: Affiliates counted refer to only majority-owned affiliates). 
(a) Foreign employment data for Altria were calculated by UNCTAD by applying the average of the 
shares of foreign employment in total employment of all companies in the same industry (omitting the 
extremes) to total employment. 
(b)Data for foreign assets, sales and employment for BAT are for activities outside Europe.  
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Table 2: The Development of Tobacco Control Policies, TTC Agency and 
Structural Environment 
 
Time 
Period 
TC & Regulatory 
Developments 
Prevailing Forms of 
TTC Agency 
Structural Context and 
Outcomes 
1950s Emerging scientific 
evidence of health 
effects in developed 
countries. 
Beginning of ‘first 
wave’ of tobacco 
litigation in USA.  
Communist Party 
takes power in 
China in 1949 and 
nationalises tobacco 
industry. 
Attempts to influence 
scientific debate (direct 
appeals to public 
opinion). 
Lobbying, campaign 
contributions.  
US firms form the 
Council for Tobacco 
Research and the 
Tobacco Institute. 
Legal defence and 
delay. 
BAT expelled from 
major market in China. 
1960s Continuing 
accumulation of 
scientific evidence. 
US Surgeon 
General’s Report 
1964. 
Introduction of 
warning labels and 
restrictions on 
advertising and 
marketing. 
Continuing 
litigation. 
Attempts to influence 
scientific debate 
covertly through front 
groups, etc. 
Lobbying, campaign 
contributions.  
Legal defence and 
delay. 
US tobacco companies 
begin to expand abroad. 
Some diversification. 
1970s Continuing 
litigation. 
Introduction of 
wider restrictions on 
advertising and 
marketing. 
Attempts to influence 
scientific debate. 
Lobbying, etc. 
TTCs form ICOSI.  
Legal defence and 
delay.  
Continued expansion 
abroad. 
1980s Introduction of 
ingredients 
disclosure 
requirements. 
Stronger and 
rotating warning 
labels targeted at 
specific populations. 
Smoking bans on air 
flights.  
‘Second wave’ of 
tobacco litigation. 
Attempts to delay or 
weaken regulation.  
Recruitment of US 
Trade Representative by 
US firms. 
Attempts to undermine 
WHO. 
Legal defence and 
delay. 
Trade liberalisation in 
Asia / Thai GATT case. 
Privatisation of East 
Asian monopolies to 
compete with TTCs. 
1990s WHO Tobacco Free Attempts to undermine US Master Settlement 
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Initiative. 
Restrictions on sales 
to minors. 
Introduction of 
smoking bans in 
selected public 
places. 
Growing use of 
price mechanisms 
(tobacco taxation) to 
discourage 
consumption. 
‘Third wave’ of 
tobacco litigation. 
WHO. 
Influence over 
legislation adopted by 
governments in 
emerging markets. 
Legal defence and 
delay, finally leading to 
settlement. 
Agreement and related 
document release 
exposes TTC behaviour 
and de-legitimises 
industry.  
Privatisation in FSU and 
Eastern Europe leads to 
take-over by TTCs.  
Large scale mergers and 
acquisitions commence.  
2000s Signing of WHO’s 
Framework 
Convention on 
Tobacco Control and 
its implementation 
in member states.  
Spread of smoke-
free legislation in 
growing number of 
countries to restrict 
second hand smoke 
in all public places 
and workplaces. 
Restrictions and 
bans on tobacco 
sponsorship. 
Introduction of 
pictorial warnings. 
Restrictions on point 
of sale advertising of 
tobacco products. 
Prosecution of TTCs 
for complicity in 
cigarette smuggling. 
Corporate social 
responsibility 
programmes.  
Adoption of voluntary 
codes. 
Continued consolidation 
at global level.  
Rationalisation of 
CNTC (China) in 
preparation for foreign 
competition and export, 
following China’s 
accession to the WTO. 
 
 
Table 3: Corporate Inputs into Social Policy  
 
Structural 
factors 
Political 
engagement 
Institutional participation 
  Informal Formal  
Imperative to 
induce 
business to 
invest. 
Social policy 
directed 
towards 
meeting the 
perceived or 
actual needs 
of business 
Only 
productive 
welfare 
thought to be 
compatible 
with 
contemporary 
economies  
Lobbying  
Funding 
political 
parties 
Distortion of 
scientific 
evidence 
‘Corporate 
social 
responsibility’ 
 
One-off 
corporate 
donations 
Provision of 
curriculum 
materials  
Workbased 
placements 
 
 
Involvement 
by 
companies 
and business 
people in 
the 
management 
of state 
services 
Education & 
Health 
Action 
Zones 
Formal 
sponsorship 
deals (eg 
City 
Academies / 
Specialist 
schools) 
Global 
Public-
Private 
Partnerships 
 
Provision and production of welfare Production of    
Harms 
Provision 
of 
services 
to end 
users 
Production of 
goods 
Suppliers of 
services to 
welfare 
providers or 
producers 
Insurance 
and 
pensions 
Investment 
in physical 
assets/ 
welfare 
facilities 
Occupational 
welfare 
Corporate 
social 
responsibility 
 
Private 
hospitals 
Private 
care 
homes 
Private 
schools 
Private 
landlords 
 
Pharmaceutical 
companies 
Medical 
equipment 
providers 
ICT companies 
Producers of 
educational 
resources 
 
Catering 
firms 
Ancillary 
services 
Management 
services 
Consultancy 
Wholesalers 
Health 
insurance 
companies 
Private 
pensions 
Sickness 
and 
personal 
injury 
companies 
Mortgage 
/ loan 
protection 
schemes 
 
REITs 
Private 
Finance 
Initiative 
consortiums 
Construction 
firms 
Occupational 
pensions 
Training 
Nursery / 
Child care 
provision 
Company 
counselling  
services 
 
Corporate 
donations 
Voluntary 
codes 
Tobacco 
Alcohol 
Guns 
Pharmaceutical 
‘side effects’ 
Unhealthy 
foods 
Environment-
related harms 
Workplace- 
related harms 
 
(Adapted from Farnsworth and Holden, 2006. New elements indicated in bold)  
